An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance. KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank in 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.· X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer; · Y is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.KYC PROFILECustomer Name: AAA International Company. LtdCustomer ID: 123456Account Opened: June 2017Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: HighAccount opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amountDuring the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul 2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:TRANSACTION JOURNALReview dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third partiesOutgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third partiesFor United States Dollars (USD) currency:Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third partiesOutgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.RFI Information and Supporting documents:According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:1) All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank. Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank's customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loanBased on the KYC profile and the transaction journal, the pattern of activity shows a deviation in:
Answer(s): A
The correct answer is A because the expected account activities were 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amount, but the actual activity showed much more frequent and varied transactions in different currencies and amounts. This indicates a deviation from the customer's profile and risk level.
Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, page 16
An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance. KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank since 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.· X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer; · Y is is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.KYC PROFILECustomer Name: AAA International Company. LtdCustomer ID: 123456Account Opened: June 2017Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: HighAccount opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans, and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amountDuring the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul 2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:TRANSACTION JOURNALReview dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third partiesOutgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third partiesFor United States Dollars (USD) currency:Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third partiesOutgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.RFI Information and Supporting documents:According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:1J All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank. Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank's customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay a loanWhich suspicious activity should the investigator identify during the review of the loan agreements?
Answer(s): D
The correct answer is D because it is a suspicious activity that Y, who is the authorized signatory of the customer, also signed on behalf of the lenders. This indicates a possible conflict of interest, collusion, or fraud. The other options are not suspicious activities based on the information given.
[Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide], page 17-18
An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance. KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank in 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.· X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer; · Y is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.KYC PROFILECustomer Name: AAA International Company. LtdCustomer ID: 123456Account Opened: June 2017Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: HighAccount opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans, and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amountDuring the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul 2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:TRANSACTION JOURNALReview dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third partiesOutgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third partiesFor United States Dollars (USD) currency:Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third partiesOutgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.RFI Information and Supporting documents:According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:1J All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank. Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank's customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loanWhich additional information would support escalating this account for closure?
Answer(s): C
A review of outward remittances reveals the same pattern of several simple steps for each transaction, which could indicate a layering scheme to obscure the origin and destination of the funds. This would support escalating this account for closure, as it is inconsistent with the customer's declared purpose and anticipated activities. The other options are not relevant or sufficient to warrant account closure.
Advanced CAMS-FCI Certification | ACAMS
An investigator at a corporate bank is conducting transaction monitoring alerts clearance. KYC profile background: An entity customer, doing business offshore in Hong Kong, established a banking business relationship with the bank since 2017 for deposit and loan purposes. It acts as an offshore investment holding company. The customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies.· X is the UBO. and owns 97% shares of this entity customer;· Y is is the authorized signatory of this entity customer. This entity customer was previously the subject of a SAR/STR.KYC PROFILECustomer Name: AAA International Company. LtdCustomer ID: 123456Account Opened: June 2017Last KYC review date: 15 Nov 2020Country and Year of Incorporation: The British Virgin Islands, May 2017 AML risk level: HighAccount opening and purpose: Deposits, Loans and Trade Finance Anticipated account activities: 1 to 5 transactions per year and around 1 million per transaction amountDuring the investigation, the investigator reviewed remittance transactions activities for the period from Jul 2019 to Sep 2021 and noted the following transactions pattern:TRANSACTION JOURNALReview dates: from July 2019 to Sept 2021For Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) currency:Incoming transactions: 2 inward remittances of around 1.88 million HKD in total from different third partiesOutgoing transactions: 24 outward remittances of around 9 4 million HKD in total to different third partiesFor United States Dollars (USD) currency:Incoming transactions: 13 inward remittances of around 3.3 million USD in total from different third partiesOutgoing transactions: 10 outward remittances of around 9.4 million USD in total to different third parties.RFI Information and Supporting documents:According to the RFI reply received on 26 May 2021, the customer provided the bank with the information below:1) All incoming funds received in HKD & USD currencies were monies lent from non-customers of the bank. Copies of loan agreements had been provided as supporting documents. All of the loan agreements were in the same format and all the lenders are engaged in trading business.2) Some loan agreements were signed among four parties, including among lenders. borrower (the bank's customer), guarantor, and guardian with supplemental agreements, which stated that the customer, as a borrower, who failed to repay the loanAfter reviewing the transaction journal, request for information response, and supporting documentation, the investigator determines that additional information is needed. Which additional information should the investigator request?
The additional information that the investigator should request is the source of the incoming funds to the group-related companies. This is because the customer declared that the ongoing source of funds to this account comes from group-related companies, but the transaction journal shows that the customer received funds from different third parties, not from group-related companies. Therefore, the investigator should verify the relationship and legitimacy of these third parties and their funds with the customer and the group-related companies. The other options are not relevant or necessary for this investigation.
CLIENT INFORMATION FORM Client Name: ABC Tech Corp Client ID. Number: 08125 Name: ABC Tech Corp Registered Address: Mumbai, India Work Address: Mumbai, India Cell Phone: "*·"'" Alt Phone:"*""* Email: ........"Client Profile Information:Sector: FinancialEngaged in business from (date): 02 Jan 2020 Sub-sector: Software-Cryptocurrency Exchange Expected Annual Transaction Amount: 125,000 USD Payment Nature: Transfer received from clients' fundReceived from: ClientsReceived for: Sale of digital assetsThe client identified itself as Xryptocurrency Exchange." The client has submitted the limited liability partnership deed. However, the bank's auditing team is unable to identify the client's exact business profile as the cryptocurrency exchange specified by the client as their major business awaits clearance from the country's regulator. The client has submitted documents/communications exchanged with the regulator and has cited the lack of governing laws in the country of their operation as the reason for the delay.During the financial crime investigation, the investigator discovers that some of the customer due diligence (CDD) documents submitted by the client were fraudulent. The investigator also finds that some of the information in the financial institution's information depository is false. What should the financial crime investigator do next?
The correct answer is C. Escalate to the compliance officer/money laundering reporting officer to file a SAR/STR. This is because the financial crime investigator has found evidence of fraudulent documents and false information, which indicate a high risk of money laundering or other financial crimes. The investigator should not contact the client directly, as this may tip them off or compromise the investigation. The investigator should also not report collusion between the cryptocurrency exchange and internal staff, as this is an assumption that has not been verified. The investigator should not request a CDD refresh, as this is not sufficient to address the serious issues identified.
Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, page 291Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, page 311Advanced CAMS-FCI Study Guide, page 3311: https://www.acams.org/en/certifications/advanced-cams/advanced-financial-crimes- investigations
CLIENT INFORMATION FORM Client Name: ABC Tech Corp Client I.D. Number: 08125 Name: ABC Tech Corp Registered Address: Mumbai, India Work Address: Mumbai. India Cell Phone: **·"-- Alt Phone: Email: *·*·*«·*·Client Profile Information:Sector: FinancialEngaged in business from (date): 02 Jan 2020Sub-sector: Software-Cryptocurrency ExchangeExpected Annual Transaction Amount: 125.000 USDPayment Nature: Transfer received from client's fundReceived from: ClientsReceived for: Sale of digital assetsThe client identified themselves as "Cryptocurrency Exchange" Client has submitted the limited liability partnership deed. However, the bank's auditing team is unable to identify the client's exact business profile as the cryptocurrency exchange specified by the client as their major business awaits clearance from the country's regulator. The client has submitted documents/communications exchanged with the regulator and has cited the lack of governing laws in the country of their operation as the reason for the delay.Investigators determine the ultimate beneficial owner of ABC Tech Corp is a high-net-worth client. The client owns a real estate agency left to her when her spouse died. The spouse provided seed capital for ABC Tech Corp through a direct 1,000.000 Great British Pound (GBP) deposit. What additional information would trigger filing a SAR/STR?
The additional information that would trigger filing a SAR/STR is the fact that the funds for the seed capital were in the form of 50 cashier's checks of 10,000 GBP each and 50 money orders of 10,000 GBP. This is because this indicates a possible attempt to avoid the reporting threshold of 10,000 GBP for cash transactions, which is a common money laundering technique known as structuring or smurfing12. The other options are not necessarily suspicious, as they do not involve cash transactions or indicate any illicit source of funds. The fact that the client's spouse was a PEP does not automatically make the transaction suspicious unless there are other red flags or risk factors associated with the PEP34
1: Money Laundering Techniques 2: Structuring 3: Politically exposed person 4: PEP Definition & Meaning - Merriam-Webster
During transaction monitoring. Bank A learns that one of their customers. Med Supplies 123. is attempting to make a payment via wire totaling 382,500 USD to PPE Business LLC located in Mexico to purchase a large order of personal protective equipment. specifically surgical masks and face shields. Upon further verification. Bank A decides to escalate and refers the case to investigators. Bank A notes that, days prior to the above transaction, the same customer went to a Bank A location to wire 1,215,280 USD to Breath Well LTD located in Singapore. Breath Well was acting as an intermediary to purchase both 3-ply surgical masks and face shields from China. Bank A decided not to complete the transaction due to concerns with the involved supplier in China. Moreover, the customer is attempting to send a third wire in the amount of 350,000 USD for the purchase of these items, this time using a different vendor in China. The investigator must determine next steps in the investigation and what actions, if any. should be taken against relevant parties.During the investigation, Bank A receives a USA PATRIOT Act Section 314(a) request related to Med Supplies 123. Which steps should the investigator take when fulfilling the request? (Select Three.)
Answer(s): D,E,F
According to the FinCEN's 314(a) Fact Sheet1, the steps that the investigator should take when fulfilling the request are:Search its records expeditiously to determine whether it maintains(ed) any accounts for the subject(s) listed in the request. This is option F .Report back to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) within 15 days of receipt of the request via a secure internet website. This is option E. Report to Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) that a match was found without revealing any other details. This is option D .The other options are incorrect because:Exiting the relationship with the business since it appears that customer is under investigation is not required by the 314(a) program and may interfere with law enforcement's investigation. This is option A .Not responding to Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) if the requested information is not present in the financial institution's system of records is contrary to the 314(a) program, which requires financial institutions to respond whether or not they have a match. This is option B . Reviewing the account(s) activity and proactively filing a SAR/STR using the 314(a) request as the basis for the filing is not appropriate, as the 314(a) request itself is not a sufficient reason to file a SAR/STR. The financial institution should only file a SAR/STR if it has its own independent suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing. This is option C .
1: FinCEN's 314(a) Fact Sheet
During transaction monitoring. Bank A learns that one of their customers. Med Supplies 123, is attempting to make a payment via wire totaling 382,500 USD to PPE Business LLC located in Mexico to purchase a large order of personal protective equipment. specifically surgical masks and face shields. Upon further verification. Bank A decides to escalate and refers the case to investigators. Bank A notes that, days prior to the above transaction, the same customer went to a Bank A location to wire 1,215,280 USD to Breath Well LTD located in Singapore. Breath Well was acting as an intermediary to purchase both 3-ply surgical masks and face shields from China. Bank A decided not to complete the transaction due to concerns with the involved supplier in China. Moreover, the customer is attempting to send a third wire in the amount of 350,000 USD for the purchase of these items, this time using a different vendor in China. The investigator must determine next steps in the investigation and what actions, if any. should be taken against relevant parties.Upon further investigation. Bank As investigator learns that both the Mexico- and Singapore-based companies are linked to the alleged suppliers in China. Which additional indicators would the investigator need to identify to determine if this fits a fentanyl (drug) trafficking typology? (Select Two.)
Answer(s): A,C
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